State v. Crisp Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 40633 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-12-2013
State v. Crisp Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40633
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Crisp Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40633" (2013). Not Reported. 1255.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1255
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) No. 40633 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) Ada Co. Case No. 
vs. ) CR-2010-14099 
) 
RANDALL DEAN CRISP, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
_____________ ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE RONALD J. WILPER 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LQRELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings ................................. 1 
ISSUE .............................................................................................................. 4 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 5 
Crisp Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred 
In Denying His Suppression Motion ...................................................... 5 
A. Introduction ................................................................................ 5 
B. Standard Of Review ................................................................... 5 
C. Crisp Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The 
Denial Of His Suppression Motion ............................................. 5 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................ 11 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) ................................................................ 6 
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 203 P.3d 1203 (2009) .................................... 6, 7 
State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 42 P.3d 706 (Ct. App. 2001) .......................... 7 
State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 283 P.3d 722 (2012) ......................................... 8 
State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007) .............................................. 5 
State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300,246 P.3d 673 (Ct. App. 2010) ............................. 6 
State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 15 P.3d 334 (Ct. App. 2000) ...................... 6, 9, 10 
State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 973 P.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1999) ........................ 6 
State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 88 P.3d 780 (Ct. App. 2004) ........................ 7 
State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 167 P.3d 783 (Ct. App. 2006) ............................. 5 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ........................................................................... 6 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) ....................................................... 5 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Randall Dean Crisp appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty pleas to felony possession of a controlled substance and 
misdemeanor driving under the influence, claiming the district court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Acting on a report from an identified motorist that Crisp was driving in a 
manner that suggested he was either "drunker than a skunk or higher than a 
kite," Lieutenant Michael Lipple located Crisp driving his motorcycle in the area 
described by the 911 caller. (#402501 Defendant's Exhibit 1; 2/25/2011 Tr., p.8, 
L.11 - p.9, L.3; #40250 R., p.42.) When Lieutenant Lipple located Crisp, Crisp 
was "going at a pretty slow speed" and he noticed that although Crisp was "not 
outside the lane," he was "weaving in the lane." (2/25/2011 Tr., p.10, Ls.20-24.) 
Officer Lipple, who was an experienced motorcycle rider, also noticed Crisp 
"popping the clutch like jerking the motorcycle, like he wasn't very familiar with 
riding a motorcycle at all, or he was having a severe mechanical problem." 
(2/25/2011 Tr., p.10, L.25 - p.11, L.10.) Officer Lipple therefore conducted a 
traffic stop to investigate Crisp's behavior. 
Officer Moore who arrived to assist Lieutenant Lipple noticed Crisp's 
"speech was very rapid," his "eyes were red and blood shot" and he was "very 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court entered an Order Taking Judicial Notice of the 
"Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript filed in [Crisp's] prior appeal No. 
40250, State v. Crisp." (R., p.2.) 
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fidgety." (2/25/2011 Tr., p.15, Ls.2-1 O; #40250 R., p.42.) Crisp "admitted to 
drinking a 12 ounce can of Budweiser beer before he got on his bike" and said 
"he was just out trying to have fun as he was driving around on the bike." 
(#40250 R., p.42.) Although Crisp had "no points" on the Horizontal Gaze 
Nystagmus Test, he exhibited a "roundhouse sway of about 2 inches off center." 
(R., p.42.) Crisp also performed poorly on other tests administered by Officer 
Moore. (R., pp.42-43.) Officer Moore arrested Crisp and, during a search 
incident to arrest, he found methamphetamine. (R., p.42.) Officer Moore 
"booked Crisp into jail for felony possession of a controlled substance, as well as 
a second offense DUI." (R., p.43.) 
The state charged Crisp with felony possession of a controlled substance 
and misdemeanor driving under the influence. (#40250 R., pp.6-7, 25-26.) Crisp 
filed a motion to suppress, asserting "police did not have reasonable and 
articulable suspicion to believe that [he] was driving his vehicle contrary to traffic 
laws, or that [he] was subject to detention in connection with a violation of any 
other law." (#40250 R., pp.32-33.) Crisp subsequently filed an amended motion 
setting forth the factual basis for his request for suppression, and asserted that 
the "information provided by the citizen informant," upon which the officer acted, 
"was not sufficient to create reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop." 
(#40250 R., p.39.) The district court denied Crisp's motion to suppress. 
(2/25/2011 Tr., p.31, L.24 - p.33, L.2; #40250 R., p.93.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Crisp pied guilty to both charges, reserving 
the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. (3/22/2011 Tr., p.5, L.21 
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- p.13, L.3; #40250 R., pp.67-74.) The court imposed a unified seven-year 
sentence with two years fixed on the possession charge and a concurrent 90-day 
sentence for driving under the influence. (#40250 R., pp.77-79.) The court, 
however, retained jurisdiction. (#40250 R., p.78.) On September 14, 2011, at 
the conclusion of the retained jurisdiction review period, the court placed Crisp on 
probation. (#40250 R., pp.83-86.) 
Approximately 11 months later, Crisp filed a notice of appeal, which was 
timely only from the district court's written order denying Crisp's motion to 
suppress, which was not filed until August 8, 2012.2 (#40250 R., pp.94-97.) The 
Idaho Supreme Court, in response to Crisp's "Motion for Order Clarifying 
Jurisdiction of Supreme Court and to Suspend Briefing Schedule Pending Court's 
Ruling," entered an order dismissing Crisp's appeal since it was only timely from 
a non-appealable order, but advising "that the district court may re-enter the 
Judgment of Conviction in Ada County District Court No. CRFE 2010-14099, in 
accordance with the relief granted in Mr. Crisp's post-conviction case, Ada 
County District Court No. CVPC 2012-10668, upon which a new Notice of Appeal 
may be filed from that re-entered judgment." (Order Dismissing Appeal, Docket 
No. 40250-2012, dated December 20, 2012.) 
The district court re-entered judgment on January 2, 2013. (R., pp.12-14.) 
Crisp timely appealed from that judgment. (R., pp.16-19.) 
2 The Order Denying Motion to Suppress had the handwritten notation, "Nunc 
Pro Tune, 2-25-11," with the judge's initials. (#40250 R., p.93.) 
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ISSUE 
Crisp states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Crisp's motion to 
suppress? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Crisp failed to establish the district court erred in denying his 
suppression motion? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
Crisp Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
Crisp asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, 
arguing "there was no reasonable suspicion to justify making the traffic stop." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Crisp's claim fails. The district court correctly concluded 
Crisp was not entitled to suppression because the information provided by the 
citizen caller and the observations of the officer were more than sufficient, under 
the totality of the circumstances, to justify a traffic stop to confirm or dispel the 
suspicion that Crisp was driving under the influence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
D. Crisp Has Failed To Demonstrate Error In The Denial Of His Suppression 
Motion 
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate 
possible criminal behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 
648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 
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411 (1981 )). "Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause but more 
than speculation or instinct on the part of the officer." State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 
300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted). The "reasonable 
suspicion" standard is an objective test that is satisfied if law enforcement can 
articulate specific facts which, along with the reasonable inferences from those 
facts, justify the suspicion that the person detained is or has been involved in 
criminal activity. State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406,408, 973 P.2d 758, 760 (Ct. 
App. 1999). The reasonable suspicion necessary to support an investigative 
detention may be supplied by an informant's tip or a citizen's report of suspected 
criminal activity. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990); State v. Larson, 
135 Idaho 99, 101, 15 P.3d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 2000). "Whether a tip amounts to 
reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances including the 
substance, source, and reliability of the information provided." State v. Bishop, 
146 Idaho 804,811,203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) (citing White, 496 U.S. at 328-
29). Factors to be considered in assessing whether a tip bears adequate indicia 
of reliability to justify a Terry3 stop include: (1) "whether the informant reveals his 
or her identity and the basis of his or her knowledge;" (2) "whether the location of 
the informant is known;" (3) "whether the information was based on first-hand 
observations of events as they were occurring;" (4) "whether the information the 
informant provided was subject to immediate confirmation or corroboration by 
police;" (5) "whether the informant has previously provided reliable information;" 
and (6) "whether the informant could be held criminally liable if the report were 
3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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discovered to be false." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811-812, 203 P.3d at 1210-11. 
"The more reliable the tip, the less information required to establish reasonable 
suspicion." 19.:. at 812, 203 P.3d at 1211. 
Whether the officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain a 
citizen is determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. State v. 
Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004). Although a 
series of facts may appear innocent when viewed separately, they may warrant 
further investigation when viewed together. State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 
917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Karen Stoneberg called 911 after witnessing Crisp riding his motorcycle in 
an erratic fashion. (40250 R., p.42.) The very first statement she made 
regarding Crisp's driving behavior was: "I'm going down Overland Road right 
now, and I'm right behind a motorcyclist and I believe he is just drunker than a 
skunk or higher than a kite." (Exhibit 1 at 00:08-00:17.) She then said, "he's like 
dipping in and out of traffic, cutting people off." (Exhibit 1 at 00:25-00:28.) She 
later reported Crisp was "swerving" and stated he was acting like he was "durnk 
or tweaking." (Exhibit 1 at 01 :50 and 5:09.) When Officer Lipple caught up with 
Crisp, he also observed Crisp weaving, driving approximately 10 miles per hour 
below the posted speed limit, and "popping the clutch like jerking the motorcycle." 
(2/25/2011 Tr., p.10, L.20 - p.11, L.10, p.18, L.23 - p.19, L.17.) 
The district court concluded that, based on what Ms. Stoneberg reported 
to dispatch along with what Officer Lipple observed, "he did have reason to 
believe that [Crisp] might have been under the influence." (2/25/2011 Tr., p.32, 
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Ls.20-25.) This conclusion was supported by the evidence presented and is 
consistent with the applicable legal standards. Crisp claims otherwise, arguing 
(1) "one could reasonably infer that [his] driving behavior was a response to Ms. 
Stoneberg following him around the neighborhood" and (2) Officer Lipple's 
observations were consistent with what could be "normal driving behavior" for an 
"inexperienced motorcyclist." (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10.) Crisp's arguments fail 
for several reasons. 
First, Crisp appears to address Ms. Stoneberg's and Officer Lipple's 
observations in isolation rather than together as is required under the applicable 
totality of the circumstances test. 
Second, although Ms. Stoneberg commented during the 911 call that 
Crisp started "looking back at her" and speculated Crisp was trying to "outrun" 
her and "lose [her]," these comments did not start until approximately two 
minutes into the call after she continued to follow Crisp in order to keep dispatch 
updated on his location. (Generally Exhibit 1.) Ms. Stoneberg's immediate 
report regarding Crisp's driving pattern was unrelated to how Crisp started 
behaving two minutes after Ms. Stoneberg called 911 and he became aware of 
her and, in Ms. Stoneberg's estimation, realized she called 911. (Exhibit 1 at 
02:30.) 
Third, that an inexperienced motorcycle rider might pop the clutch and 
weave within his lane does not mean such behavior is inadequate to establish 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the person is under the influence as 
opposed to unfamiliar with his vehicle. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 411, 283 
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P.3d 722, 728 (2012) ("the existence of alternative innocent explanations does 
not necessarily negate reasonable suspicion") (citations omitted). It would be a 
novel proposition indeed to suggest that anytime an officer observes a motorist 
weaving in his lane or engaging in some other behavior that could be explained 
by inexperience or lack of familiarity with his car, that the officer must assume as 
much rather than confirm or dispel any suspicion that the person is under the 
influence. 
The Court's opinion in State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 15 P.3d 334 (Ct. 
App. 2000), is instructive. In Larson, a woman called dispatch to report "that a 
man whom she did not know, and who appeared to be drunk, was knocking on 
her door." 135 Idaho at 100, 15 P.3d at 335. While the woman was on the 
phone with dispatch, the man got into a truck and left. ~ Based on the caller's 
description, an officer conducted a traffic stop on the suspect's vehicle. ~ 
During the course of that stop, the officer determined Larson was driving under 
the influence and arrested him. lQ,,, 
In affirming the denial of Larson's suppression motion, the Court noted the 
reliability of the information provided by the caller since she called from a 
"specified address" and "was on the telephone with the dispatcher and was 
reporting unfolding events even as [the officer] was responding to the call" and 
"some of the information given by the caller was corroborated by the officer's 
observations before he stopped Larson's vehicle." Larson, 135 Idaho at 102, 15 
P.3d at 337. The Court concluded: 
We have no difficulty concluding that the totality of these 
"articulable facts" known to the police officer created a reasonable 
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suspicion that the driver of the pickup was the person who had 
been knocking on the caller's door and that he was intoxicated. 
Therefore, the detention to investigate whether Larson was driving 
while intoxicated was justified, and Larson's suppression motion 
was properly denied. 
Larson, 135 Idaho at 102, 15 P.3d at 337. 
As in Larson, Ms. Stoneberg witnessed Crisp's behavior firsthand and 
believed he was "drunker than a skunk or higher than a kite," provided a detailed 
description of that behavior and Crisp to dispatch, remained on the phone until 
law enforcement arrived on scene and corroborated her observations, and 
stayed on scene to provide information to the investigating officers. (Exhibit 1.) 
Her assessment that Crisp was driving under the influence was no less valid than 
the caller's assessment in Larson. 
Crisp argues Larson is distinguishable "because the defendant's conduct 
in Larson could not be explained as normal behavior" whereas Crisp's driving 
could be. (Appellant's Brief, p.9 n.3.) Crisp provides no explanation for this 
assertion and exactly why Crisp believes it is abnormal to knock on someone's 
door whether or not intoxicated but perfectly normal to drive as though you are 
under the influence is unclear. In any event, the ultimate concern in both Larson 
and this case was the same - driving under the influence - and the detention to 
investigate that concern was justified in both cases. Crisp has failed to establish 
otherwise. 
The district court correctly concluded Officer Lipple had reasonable 
articulable suspicion to investigate whether Crisp was driving under the influence. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Crisp's conditional guilty pleas to felony possession of a controlled 
substance and misdemeanor driving under the influence 
DATED this 1ih day of July, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1ih day of July, 2013, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
J 
Deputy Attorney General 
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